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EXTRADITION AND LIFE
IMPRISONMENT
I. INTRODUCTION

The Mexican Supreme Court issued two landmark extradition
opinions in 2001. First, on January 18, 2001, the Mexican Supreme
Court declared that the extradition of Mexican nationals is legal.2
This decision marked a drastic policy change from Mexico's
historical reluctance to extradite nationals.' Subsequently, on
October 2, 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court clarified their earlier
ruling, holding that Mexico will not extradite suspects who face a
potential life sentence in the country requesting extradition.4
This Comment focuses on Mexico's October 2001 ruling. This
decisive ruling raises several important issues ranging from specific
effects on U.S. sentencing guidelines to the general impact on
extradition policies between the United States and Mexico.
To ensure continued extradition from Mexico to the United
States, the United States must follow Mexican sentencing
guidelines. Moreover, to further facilitate extradition, the U.S.-

1. Extradition is defined as "[t]he official surrender of an alleged criminal by one
state or nation to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 605 (7th ed. 1999).
2. 13 S.J.F. 9 (9a 6poca 2001), analyzed in Supreme Court Imposes New Limits on
Extradition, SOURCEMEX ECONOMIC NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEXICO, Oct. 10, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 10229580.
3. Mexico's Highest Court Approves Quicker Extradition of Drug Traffickers to U.S,
SOURCEMEX ECONOMIC NEWS & ANALYSIS ON MEXICO, Jan. 24, 2001, available at 2001

WL 10229484 [hereinafter Mexico's Highest Court Approves Quicker Extradition];
Rodrigo Labardini, Mexico's Supreme Court Allows the Extradition of Mexican Nationals,
17 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 106, 108-09 (2001).

4. 14 S.J.F. 13 (9a 6poca 2001), analyzed in Rodrigo Labardini, Extradition from
Mexico Allowed with Assurances that Life Imprisonment Will Not Be Imposed, 18 INT'L
ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 404,404 (2002) [hereinafter Labardini, Life Imprisonment].
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Mexico Extradition Treaty' must adequately articulate non-life
imprisonment assurances.
This Comment also compares Mexico's approach to
extradition to the judicially created rule of non-inquiry in the
United States.6 The rule of non-inquiry provides that U.S. courts
will not question the procedures or punishments that await an
extraditee in a foreign country. In Gallina v. Fraser,however, the
Second Circuit announced, in dictum, a possible humanitarian
exception to the rule of non-inquiry." The rule of non-inquiry does
not need to be abandoned if courts apply the humanitarian
exception in appropriate cases.
Part II discusses pertinent principles and information relating
to extradition between the United States and Mexico. Part III
analyzes Mexico's decisive Supreme Court rulings, specifically the
January and October 2001 rulings. It explores the effect of these
rulings on international extradition between the United States and
Mexico, including the difficulty of providing non-life imprisonment
assurances to Mexico. Additionally, Part III reviews several
alternatives to extradition, as well as concerns other countries
share with respect to life imprisonment sentences. Finally, Part III
compares Mexico's approach to international extradition with the
judicially created rule of non-inquiry in the United States. 9
II. BACKGROUND
The contentious history of extradition between the United
States and Mexico is framed by key aspects of Mexico's
Constitution and judicial system, the 1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty, and extradition procedures in the United States and
Mexico.

5. Extradition Treaty, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059 [hereinafter U.S.Mexico Extradition Treaty].
6. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901); Richard J. Wilson, Toward the
Enforcement of Universal Human Rights Through Abrogation of the Rule of Non Inquiry
in Extradition, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 751, 753 (1997) (discussing the rule of noninquiry created by the Neely court).
7. Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983);
Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999).
8. Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1960).
9. Neely, 180 U.S. at 109.
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A. Reluctance and Mistrust

Extradition between the United States and Mexico "has been
plagued by reluctance and mistrust. ' Historically, Mexico has
been reluctant to extradite its nationals." Indeed, before 1995,
Mexico had never extradited a Mexican national. 2 Furthermore,
Mexico has even been reluctant to extradite U.S citizens to the
1994, Mexico
United States. 3 For example, between 1980 and
14
extradited only eight people to the United States.
The United States contributes to the climate of reluctance and
mistrust through the use of transborder abduction. 5 In 1990, the
forcible abduction of Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain from
Guadalajara, Mexico to the United States caused significant
upheaval in U.S.-Mexico relations. 6 Mexico viewed the abduction
as an egregious violation of their territorial sovereignty 7 and was
appalled when the U.S. Supreme Court authorized the abduction
of Dr. Alvarez-Machain as a legitimate means of obtaining
jurisdiction over the matter.18
Extradition between the United States and Mexico is also
hampered by the differing views each country has with respect to
the death penalty. 9 For example, in Mexico, the death penalty is
"constitutionally contemplated," but not applied.20 In the United

10. Rishi Hingoraney, Note, International Extradition of Mexican Narcotics
Traffickers: Prospectsand Pitfallsfor the New Millennium, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 331,
331 (2002).
11. Id.

12. Labardini, supra note 3, at 109.
13. Dea Abramschmitt, Comment, Neighboring Countries; Un-neighborly Acts: A
Look at the Extradition Relationships Among the United States, Mexico, and Canada,4 J.

TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 121,129-30 (1995).
14. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 405. The United States also did not
extradite many people to Mexico between 1980 and 1994. During these years, the United
States extradited only thirty people to Mexico. Id.
15. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 331.
16. Id. at 331-32, 352-53.
17. Id. at 332.
18. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 332 (the abduction of Alvarez-Machain was upheld
as a matter of U.S. constitutional law, not customary international law).
19. See Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 342.
20. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 404 n.36. Article 22 of the Mexican
Constitution allows the death penalty for "high treason committed during a foreign war,
parricide, murder that is treacherous, premeditated, or committed for profit, arson,
abduction, highway robbery, piracy, and grave military offenses." MEX. CONST. art. 22.
The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty prohibits extradition if a potential extraditee faces
the death penalty in the United States. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, art. 8.
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States, on the other hand, the death penalty is applied.21 In Gregg
v. Georgia, the United States Supreme Court declared "that the
punishment of death does not invariably violate the
Constitution., 2 Consequently, the two contrasting views on the
death penalty hampers international extradition because Mexico
often refuses to extradite if a defendant potentially awaits the
death penalty in the United States.23
B. Three Key Aspects of Mexico's Constitution and JudicialSystem
Three important aspects of Mexico's Constitution and judicial
system provide necessary background for this Comment. First,
Mexico is a civil law country where stare decisis "carries little
weight." 24 As a result, judges in Mexico decide cases bY
interpreting and applying black letter law instead of case law.
Second, as mentioned above, the death penalty is "constitutionally
contemplated" but not applied in Mexico. Finally, Mexico's
Constitution requires that inmates be given the opportunity for
rehabilitation. 27
C. 1978 U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty
The current extradition treaty between the United States and
Mexico was signed on May 4, 1978 and entered into force on
January 25, 1980. s Article 1, paragraph 2 of the treaty allows
extradition for "offense[s] committed outside the territory of the
requesting [state]" if the laws of the requested state "provide for
the punishment of such an offense" or if "the person sought is a
national of the requesting [state]. '29 Additionally, the offense must

21. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22. Id. at 169.
23. Greg Moran, Mexican Ruling Complicates Extraditions;Prosecutors Here Stymied
in Life-term Cases, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 25,2002, at A3.
24. Bruce Zagaris & Julia Padierna Peralta, Mexico-United States Extradition and
Alternatives: From Fugitive to Drug Traffickers-150 Years and Beyond the Rio Grande's
Winding Courses, 12 AM. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 519,533 (1997).
25. Id. This is important because Mexico's October 2001 ruling was made based on an
interpretation and application of specific Mexican constitutional provisions. See Labardini,
Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 408.
26. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 409 n.36 (2002).
27. Id. at 410 (explaining that according to Mexico's October 2001 ruling, life
sentences leave no opportunity for rehabilitation).
28. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5.
29. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
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be punishable by both countries, and requires a "deprivation of
liberty" of more than one year.3O
The U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty uses the list method for
extraditable crimes." Under the list method, to be an extraditable
offense, the crime must be one of the thirty-one listed offenses in
the appendix of the treaty.32 A crime not listed in the appendix is
still extraditable, however, if it involves "willful acts which are
punishable, in accordance with the federal laws of both countries,
by a deprivation of liberty for no less than one year."3 3
Two other articles of the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty are
relevant here. One is Article 8 of the treaty, which provides:
When the offense for which extradition is requested is
punishable by death under the laws of the requesting Party and
the laws of the requested Party do no permit such punishment
for that offense, extradition may be refused unless the
requesting Party furnishes such assurances as the requested
Party considers sufficient that the death penalty shall not be
imposed, or, if imposed, shall not be executed.
Thus, the treaty allows extradition to the United States in death
penalty cases, if the United States "furnishes such assurances" that
the death penalty will be not be imposed.
Article 9 is the second relevant article of the U.S.-Mexican
Extradition Treaty. According to Article 9, extradition of nationals
is not mandatory, but discretionary: "[n]either Contracting Party
shall be bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive
authority of the requested Party shall, if not prevented by the laws
of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its
discretion, it be deemed proper to do so."'" Article 9 further
provides that in all other cases, those not involving nationals, the
United States and Mexico are bound by the duty to extradite or
prosecute, which means that a country must either extradite or
prosecute a suspect, if so requested by the other country.36

30. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
31. Id. app.
32. Id. art. 2, para. 1, app.; Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 579. The thirty-one
extraditable offenses range from murder to kidnapping to embezzlement. U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, app.
33. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 579; U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra
note 5, art. 2, para. 3.
34. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 8.
35. Id. art. 9, para. 1.
36. Id. art. 9, para. 2.
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D. Mexico's Proceduresfor Extradition to the United States
The U.S. State Department, through diplomatic channels,
presents extradition requests to the Mexican Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.37 The Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs decides
whether the request conforms with Mexican law and the U.S.Mexico Extradition Treaty. 8 If the request satisfies the
requirements, the extradition materials are given to the Mexican
Attorney General.3 9 A Mexican district judge will then determine
if there is probable cause"° to believe "the suspect committed the
crime charged in the extradition request.",4' If the district judge
finds probable cause, the requested suspect is arrested and an
extradition hearing is held before the judge. 42 The judge decides
whether to extradite the suspect, but the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs also reviews such decisions.43 Indeed, the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is the final authority in deciding whether
extradition is appropriate. 4
E. ExtraditionProceduresfrom the United States
In the United States, international extradition is under the
purview of the federal government.4 ' Federal magistrate judges
decide the question of extraditability based on the applicable
extradition treaty. 46 The magistrate judge decides whether there is
probable cause "to believe that the person before the court is
extraditable., 47 If a magistrate judge finds a defendant
extraditable, the Secretary of State decides whether to surrender
481
the defendant to the requesting state. When the Secretary of
State signs a surrender warrant, the United States Marshals service
handles the transfer of the extraditee.4 9

37. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 551.
38. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339; Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 543.
39. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339; Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 543.
40. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339.
41. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 544.
42. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 339-40.
45. John B. Quigley, The Rule of Non-Inquiry and the Impact of Human Rights on
Extradition Law, 15 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 401,402 (1990).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2000); Quigley, supra note 45, at 402.
47. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 561.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (2000); Quigley, supra note 45, at 402.
49. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 561.
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Thus, in the United States and Mexico, the federal
government handles extradition. ° For example, the federal
government of each country makes the final decision on whether
to extradite a suspect to the requesting state.51 In the United
States, the final decision on whether to extradite is made by the
Secretary of State," and in Mexico, the final decision is made by
the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 53 Additionally, federal
judges in each country make the preliminary finding of whether
the suspect is extraditable.5 4 In the United States, however, if a
federal magistrate judge finds that a suspect is extraditable, the
Secretary of State decides whether to surrender the suspect to the
requesting state.55 Conversely, in Mexico, the federal judge decides
whether to extradite the suspect. 56 The Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, however, reviews the judge's finding and
ultimately makes the decision.57
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Law in Mexico
The following section analyzes the Mexican Supreme Court
decisions of January 18, 2001 and October 2, 2001, in addition to
several alternatives to extradition.
1. January 18, 2001 Mexican Supreme Court Ruling
On January 18, 2001, the Mexican Supreme Court ruled that
the extradition of Mexican nationals from Mexico does not violate
the Mexican Constitution." Pursuant to this landmark ruling, the
Mexican federal government has "discretionary" power to

50. Quigley, supra note 45, at 402; Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339-40.
51. Id.
52. Quigley, supra note 45, at 402.
53. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339-40.
54. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 561; Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339. In
Mexico, the district judge determines whether there is probable cause to believe "the
suspect committed the crime charged in the extradition request." Zagaris & Peralta, supra
note 24, at 544. In the United States, the federal magistrate judge determines whether
there is probable cause 'to relieve the person is extraditable." Id. at 561.
55. Quigley, supra note 45, at 402.
56. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 339.
57. Id. at 339-40.
58. 13 S.J.F. 9 (9a dpoca 2001), analyzed in Supreme Court Imposes New Limits on
Extradition,supra note 2.
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extradite Mexican nationals if they are sentenced according to
Mexican guidelines.59 This decision marked a drastic change in
Mexico's extradition policies, which are known for a reluctance to
extradite nationals.60 Prior to this holding, Mexico extradited
several of its nationals to the United States, but "the extradition
process had become delayed by endless appeals."'" The January
2001 ruling definitively declared that the extradition of Mexican
nationals is constitutional and can be expedited by limiting the
number of appeals for Mexican nationals accused of drug
trafficking in the United States.62 Pursuant to this ruling, Mexico
extradited eight nationals to the United States in 2001.63 This is the
identical number of people Mexico extradited to the United States
between 1980 and 1994.6 Therefore, the January 2001 ruling is
significant because in one year Mexico extradited the same
number of people as it had over the previous fourteen years.
The January 2001 ruling paved the way for the extradition of
Mexican national, Everardo Arturo Paez-Martinez. 6' The Mexican
Supreme Court held that the Mexican government could extradite
Paez-Martinez to the United States where he would face drug
smuggling charges in California.6 Paez-Martinez was a member of
the Arellano Felix Drug Trafficking Organization (AFO) and
"represented the first extradition from Mexico to the United
States of a high-ranking member of the AFO. '' 67 In a companion
case, the court ruled that the Mexican government could extradite
another Mexican national, Oscar Malherbe de Leon, to the United

59. Mexico's Highest CourtApproves Quicker Extradition,supra note 3.
60. Id.; see also Labardini, supra note 3, at 108-09. This is in accordance with the 1978
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, which provides "[n]either Contracting Party shall be
bound to deliver up its own nationals, but the executive authority of the requested Party
shall, if not prevented by the laws of that Party, have the power to deliver them up if, in its
discretion, it be deemed proper to do so." U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5,
art. 9, para. 1.
61. Mexico's Highest CourtApproves Quicker Extradition, supra note 3.
62. Id.
63. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 406 (two of the Mexican nationals
had dual citizenship).
64. ld. at 405.
65. Press Release, Office of the United States Attorney, Southern District of
California, AFO Kingpin Sentenced to 30 Years in Prison (Jan. 14, 2002) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Press Release].
66. Mexico's Highest CourtApproves Quicker Extradition,supra note 3.
67. Press Release, supra note 65.
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States to stand trial . Maiherbe was indicted in 1990 in the United
States as "a top aide to the Tamaulipas-based Gulf drug cartel."69
At the time of the January 2001 ruling, it appeared that if
Mexican nationals did not face the death penalty in the United
States, their extradition would conform to Mexican sentencing71
guidelines" ' because the death penalty is not applied in Mexico.
Moreover, the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty allows for
extradition to the United States in death penalty cases, provided
the United States "furnishes such assurances" that the death
penalty will not be imposed or executed.2
2. October 2, 2001 Mexican Supreme Court Ruling
The Mexican Supreme Court clarified their January 2001
ruling on October 2, 2001. 73 The court held that the state
requesting extradition "must provide assurances that life
imprisonment will not be imposed., 4 The court's decision was
based on Article 22 of the Mexican Constitution,75 pronouncing
that "[p]unishment by mutilation and infamy, branding, flogging,
beating with sticks, torture of any kind, excessive fines,
confiscation of property and any other unusual or extreme
punishments are prohibited."" According to the court, Article 22
prohibits life imprisonment because it is an "unusual or extreme"
punishment.77 Rodrigo _Labardini, an expert on Mexican
extradition law, asserts that life imprisonment is an "unusual or
extreme" punishment because "it does not contemplate or allow
for the constitutional principles of social readaptation and humane
'
punishment embodied in articles 18 and 22 of the Constitution."78

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id.
Id.
See Mexico's Highest Court Approves Quicker Extradition,supra note 3.
Labardini, Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 404 n.36.
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 8.

73.

Hugh Dellios, Mexico, U.S. Cultural Split Complicates Extradition, CHI. TRIB.,

June 14, 2002, at N1.
74. Labardini, Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 404.
75. 14 S.J.F. 13 (9a 6poca 2001), analyzed in Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note
4, at 406.
76. MEX. CONST. art. 22.
77. See 14 S.J.F. 13 (9a 6poca 2001), analyzed in Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra
note 4, at 406.
78. Id. at 408.

750
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The Mexican Supreme Court emphasized that pursuant to
Article 18 of the Mexican Constitution, social readaptation is the
primary goal of criminal sentencing.7 9 The court opined that the
goals of social readaptation are not met if life imprisonment
prevents an individual from returning to society. 8° Furthermore,
life imprisonment is "cruel and inhuman and disproportionate due
to its unspecified duration in years., 81 Accordingly, the Mexican
Supreme Court ruled that life imprisonment is proscribed by
articles 18 and 22 of the Mexican Constitution. 2
The October 2001 holding did not clearly define the scope of
"life imprisonment." 83 Article 25 of the Mexican Federal Criminal
Code permits a maximum prison term of sixty years." Article 25,
notwithstanding, Article 366, section III permits a seventy-year5
sentence with no parole for kidnappers who kill their victims.
Therefore, it appears that a sentence longer than sixty years
constitutes "life imprisonment." In the case of kidnappers who
murder their victims, however, a sentence longer than seventy
years without parole constitutes "life imprisonment."
It is unclear whether the difference between a life sentence
with parole and a life sentence without parole is a distinction
without a difference. 86 Extradition experts agree that "the ruling
prohibits extradition of suspects who face no-parole
imprisonments, [but] some say it also applies to those who face any
' Thus, the
sentence in which they could spend life in prison."87
October ruling would significantly expand if it applied to any
sentence that carried the possibility of life in prison.8 For example,
in California, any Mexican national facing a third felony conviction
would escape extradition because for certain specified offenses, a
third felony conviction carries a term of life imprisonment, with

79. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 410.
80. Id.
81.

14 S.J.F. 13 (9a dpoca 2001), analyzed in Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note

4, at 410.
82.

Id.

83. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4. at 411; Moran, supra note 23.
84.

CODIGO PENAL PARA EL DISTRITO FEDERAL [C.P.D.F.]

art. 25 (Mex.),

translatedin Labardini, Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 409 n.38.
85. C.P.D.F. art. 366(111) (Mex.), translated in Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra
note 4, at 409 n.38.
86. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 411.
87. Moran, supra note 23.
88. Id.
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the possibility of parole in twenty years. 89 It remains unclear how
the Mexican Supreme Court will treat such prison sentences.
The Mexican Supreme Court emphasized that non-life
imprisonment assurances are procedural requirements that do not
affect the substance of an extradition petition." This procedural
requirement, however, may impede international extradition, 9 as
seen in the case of Jesus Amezcua, a drug trafficker known as the
"king of amphetamines."93 In May 2002, a lower Mexican tribunal
ruled, in Amezcua's case, that a "diplomatic note from U.S.
officials promising that prosecutors would not seek a life sentence
was not a sufficient guarantee." 94 Amezcua's lawyer explained that
the diplomatic note was insufficient because "U.S. courts are
independent of the executive branch, so he could be sentenced to a
life term anyway." 95 Indeed, the separation of power between the
executive and judicial branches complicates qualifying adequate
non-life imprisonment assurances.
An excellent example of a successful extradition case is the
case of Everardo Arturo Paez-Martinez.96 The January 2001 ruling
paved the way for the extradition of this Mexican national. 97 PaezMartinez originally faced a life sentence in the United States.!
Before he was extradited, however, the Mexican Supreme Court's
October 2001 ruling prohibited the extradition of suspects facing
life imprisonment. 99 After this ruling, Paez-Martinez pled guilty to
a charge carrying a thirty-year sentence,1°° which is well within
Mexico's sixty-year maximum prison term.1 1 According to Patrick
K. O'Toole, the U.S. Attorney on the Paez-Martinez case, "the
resolution and the sentence demonstrates our ability to balance
Mexico's constitutionally protected rights afforded to its citizens

89. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667.7 (Deering 1998); Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra
note 4, at 411 n.52.
90. See Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4. at 411.
91. Id. at 409.
92. Id. at 412-13.
93. Dellios, supra note 73.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Press Release, supra note 65.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. C.P.D.F. art. 25 (Mex.), translatedin Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4,
at 409 n.38.
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with the critical need to extradite and prosecute leaders of the
AFO. '' 10 2 Therefore, it appears that some U.S. prosecutors
compromise and abide by Mexico's October 2001 ruling to
successfully extradite suspects charged of crimes in the United
States.03 Furthermore, it also appears that at least some lower
Mexican tribunals accept non-life imprisonment assurances from
prosecutors.
Other prosecutors, however, believe that Mexico's October
2001 ruling will frustrate their ability to seek appropriately harsh
punishments"'9 For example, the extradition of Juan Manuel
Casillas Jr. was barred because the Los Angeles extraditions unit
was "unwilling to drop charges that carry a no-parole sentence."1 5
Casillas, a Mexican national, was charged with killing two teenage
girls.' 6 The Los Angeles extraditions unit sought Casillas'
extradition before Mexico's October 2001 ruling and was willing to
forgo pursuit of the death penalty to secure his extradition. 7
Before Casillas was extradited, however, Mexico handed down
their October ruling. The Los Angeles extraditions unit refused to
comply with this ruling.'8 Other prosecutors agree with the Los
Angeles extraditions unit and have refused to comply with
Mexico's October 2001 ruling.' °9 This is significant because if U.S.
prosecutors refuse to comply with Mexico's ruling, it may bring
international extradition between the United States and Mexico to
a standstill. " "
If the United States refuses to comply with Mexico's ruling,
the October 2001 ruling may severely limit extradition "of the
most serious criminals" from Mexico to the United States."' The

102. Press Release, supra note 65.
103. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 413-14 (noting that Arizona
prosecutors assured Mexico that they would not seek life sentences).
104. Dellios, supra note 73.
105. Moran, supra note 23.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108.

Id.

109. See Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 414.
110. As of July 2002, Mexico has denied the extradition of seventy defendants facing
life imprisonment in the United States. See Bruce Zagaris, Mexican Court Denies U.S.
Extradition Request Due to PotentialLife Sentence, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 270,

270 (2002).
111. BUREAU FOR INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT 2001 (2002), at
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reason for this is "the vast majority of fugitives requested via
extradition are normally charged with serious offenses carrying
possible life sentences. 12 Furthermore, death penalty crimes
constitute only a small percentage of crimes; whereas crimes
carrying possible life sentences are more abundant.1 1 3 This presents
a number of problems because while non-death penalty assurances
are provided for in the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, ' 4 non-life
imprisonment assurances are not."5 Thus, Mexico is under no
obligation to extradite even if the United States offers non-life
imprisonment assurances. Moreover, as the U.S. State Department
declared, "the U.S. is generally not able to provide formal
assurances to any country that a prospective extraditee will not
face a life sentence."' 6 The reason the United States cannot
generally provide formal non-life imprisonment assurances is
because at sentencing, prosecutors "can only recommend [to] a
judge the length of the sentence."'".7 With the death penalty, on the
to pursue the death penalty is a
other hand, the "decision
8
choice.""
prosecutor's
Therefore, it is necessary for the United States and Mexico to
establish what would constitute an appropriate non-life
imprisonment assurance. This may include a judge abiding by a
prosecutor's sentencing request if the prosecutor assured the
Mexican government that a life sentence would not be imposed. In
addition, it may be necessary to rewrite the current U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty to provide for adequate non-life imprisonment
assurances.

http://www.state.gov/g/in/rs/nrcrpt/2001/rpt/8478.htm

[hereinafter

INT'L

NARCOTICS

CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT].

112. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 412 (In general, prosecutors only
pursue extradition where the case is serious enough and the defendant faces a potential
life sentence.).
113. Moran, supra note 23.
114. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 8.
115. INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 111; Labardini, Life
Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 406, 413.
116.

INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, supra note 111.

117. Labardini, Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 413 n.75.
118. Id.
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3. Criticisms of Mexico's October 2001 Ruling
Mexico's October 2001 ruling has come under attack as being
adverse to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty. 9 For example,
the US.-Mexico Extradition Treaty does not mention non-life
imprisonment assurances, 120 but the October 2001 ruling mandates
such an assurance before extraditing a suspect. In addition, U.S.
officials believe that crimes committed in the United States are
punishable according to U.S. sentencing guidelines, not
Mexico's.' 2' As a result, Mexico's ruling provoked the fifty state
attorney generals to send a letter to U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft and Secretary of State Colin Powell, urging the United
States to protest Mexico's decision. 2 2 The attorney generals
complained that Mexico's ruling not only "unduly interferes with
our sovereignty but also creates an unhealthy and dangerous
incentive for people to commit grievous crimes and escape into
Mexico. ,,123
The attorney generals' warning is compounded by Mexico's
October 2001 ruling, which did not discuss the nationality of
possible extraditees. 1 4 This means that the ruling applies "to all
fugitives in Mexican territory" and is not simply limited to
Mexican nationals.125 Therefore, it is possible that Mexico would
refuse to extradite a U.S. citizen who fled to Mexico if a potential
life sentence awaited the citizen in the United States. It appears
that such a scenario would interfere with U.S. sovereignty because
Mexico would be imposing its sentencing guidelines in the United
States against a U.S. citizen.
4. Alternatives to Extradition
There are currently three potential alternatives to extradition.
Varying in degree of complexity, these alternatives are:
deportation, abduction, and the duty to extradite or prosecute.

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 412.
Id. at 406.
Id. at 412.
Dellios, supra note 73.
Id.
Labardini, Life Imprisonment,supra note 4, at 408.
Id.
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a. Deportation
The case of Christian Longo, a U.S. citizen, is an excellent
example of how efficient, as well as time and cost-effective,
deportation can be. 26 Longo was suspected of murdering his wife
and three children in Oregon, and subsequently fled to Mexico. 27
After being identified in Mexico and captured by Mexican
authorities, Longo "waived his right to an extradition hearing
despite the fact that Mexico normally does not extradite fugitives
who encounter the potential of the death penalty."''" Several hours
later, Longo was deported to the United States. 29 This case
illustrates that Mexico "will arrest and instantly deport U.S.
citizens whose arrest the U.S. requests on criminal charges.'' o
Thus, deportation of U.S. citizens is a great alternative to the
lengthy extradition process. Furthermore, deportation avoids
treading on U.S. sovereignty. Specifically, with deportation,
Mexican sentencing guidelines would not be imposed or even
implicated.
b. Abduction
Abduction is a potential alternative to extradition, 3' although
it is controversial. "Abduction or kidnapping is the seizure of a
fugitive on the territory of another state without the consent of the
latter. This seizure can be effected by agents of the requesting
state or by private persons acting on its behalf.', 3 2 On June 15,
1992, the U.S. Supreme Court, in the case of United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, found that the forcible abduction of Dr.
Alvarez-Machain from Mexico did not violate the U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty because the extradition treaty is silent on the
issue of abductions."' Therefore, the Court held that the forcible

126. See Bruce Zagaris, Mexico Arrests and Hands Over U.S. Citizen Wanted for
Oregon Murders, 18 INT'L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 102, 102 (2002).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 103.
129. Id. at 102.
130. Id. at 103.
131. See CHRISTINE VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENCE EXCEPTION TO
EXTRADITION: THE DELICATE PROBLEM OF BALANCING THE
INDIVIDUAL AND THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC ORDER 51(1980).

RIGHTS

OF THE

132. Id.
133. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 655, 657, 663, 666, 670 (1992); Bradley Thrush,
United States' Sanctioned Kidnapping Abroad: Can the United States Restore International
Confidence in its Extradition Treaties?, 11 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 181,181-82 (1994).
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abduction of Dr. Alvarez-Machain "does not.., prohibit his trial
in a court in the United
States for violations of the criminal laws of
134
States.,
United
the
The Alvarez-Machain decision outraged the Mexican
government and the international community.1 5 In fact,
"[g]overnments around the world condemned the decision as a
blatant violation of international law, and sent formal protests to
the U.S. government."'1 36 Indeed, the Alvarez-Machain decision
spurred a chain reaction throughout the region. 37 As a result of the
decision, Mexico temporarily stopped cooperating with U.S. drug
enforcement agents in Mexico.
In addition, other Latin
American countries refused to honor United States' extradition
requests.39
On November 23, 1994, the United States and Mexico signed
a Treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions. 40 The treaty is not
in effect, however, because it has not been submitted to the Senate
for ratification. 4' Therefore, it appears that transborder abduction
is still an option in the United States.
As mentioned earlier, the Alvarez-Machain decision added to
the climate of mistrust between Mexico and the United States. 4 2 It
is worrisome that, as a result of Mexico's October 2001 ruling, the
United States could resort to transborder abductions when
extradition is blocked due to the procedural requirement that life
imprisonment cannot be imposed. There is a consensus that
transborder abduction violates customary international law. 43 In
fact, authorities believe that it is "flatly impermissible under
longstanding customary norms for one state to send its agents to
seize an individual located in the territory of another state without

134. Alvarez-Machain,504 U.S. at 670.
135. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 352.
136. Id.
137. Various Latin American governments protested the United States decision. In
addition, the United States received threats of retaliation against U.S. citizens from
countries requesting extradition from the United States. Id.
138.

Id.

139. Id.
140. Zagaris & Peralta, supra note 24, at 592.
141.

Id.

142.

Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 331.

143. Michael J. Glennon, International Kidnapping: State-sponsored Abduction: A
Comment on United States v. Alvarez-Machain,86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. NEWSL. 746, 746-47

(1992).
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the consent of the government of that state."'" Consequently, the
United States should not resort to transborder abductions as an
alternative to extradition.
c. The Duty to Extradite or Prosecute
A third possible alternative to extradition is simply the duty
to extradite or prosecute. 45 This duty, commonly referred to as aut
dedere aut judicare, is found in Article 9 of the U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty. 46 The treaty states, "[i]f extradition is not
granted pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the requested
Party shall submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution, provided that Party has jurisdiction over
the offense.' 4 4 The principle of aut dedere aut judicare, however, is
not a viable option because of endemic corruption in Mexican law
enforcement. 118 One commentator asserted that "drug kingpins
enjoy a virtual immunity from arrest or molestation."14 Thus, the
principle of aut dedere aut judicare is insufficient to cure the
problem posed by Mexico's October 2001 ruling: if Mexico refuses
to extradite a drug trafficker to the United States due to a possible
life sentence, the drug trafficker will go virtually unpunished in
Mexico.
Because deportation appears to be the only viable alternative
to extradition, the United States must arrive at a solution to the
extradition problem posed by Mexico's October 2001 ruling.
5. Other Countries Also Forbid Life Imprisonment
Mexico's October 2001 ruling should also cause concern
because other countries share Mexico's disdain for life
imprisonment." 0 Portugal, Venezuela, Brazil, Colombia, Costa

144. Id. at 746. The American Law Institute asserts that it is customary international
law for a state to obtain the consent of another state before "[a] state's law enforcement
officers may exercise their function in the territory of another state." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 432(2) (1987).
145. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE:
THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1995).

146. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 9, para. 2; Hingoraney, supra
note 10, at 335.
147. U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty, supra note 5, art. 9, para. 2.
148. Hingoraney, supra note 10, at 349.
149. Id.
150. Labardini, Life Imprisonnent,supra note 4, at 411.
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Rica, and El Salvador also forbid life imprisonment."' Moreover,
the Inter-American
Convention on Extradition prohibits
extradition "when the offense in question is punishable in the
requesting state by the death penalty, by life imprisonment, or by
degrading punishment.1 5 2 Thus, the United States should be
concerned that other countries may also forbid extradition if a
suspect faces life imprisonment in the United States.153
6. The Age-Crime Curve
The concern that Mexico's non-life imprisonment policy will
interfere with the ability of prosecutors to seek stiff punishments
should be alleviated by Mexico's sixty-year prison terms.' 54 Indeed,
criminological
research
has consistently
confirmed that
adolescents and young adults commit most crimes. 5 5 This
phenomenon is known as the age-crime curve.156 Consistent with
this phenomenon, criminologist Larry J. Siegel asserts that "hard
core chronic offenders commit less crime as they age. 1 57 Although
crime rates decline at various rates for different offenses, in
general, crime rates steadily decline after the age of thirty.1'' For
example, the murder arrest rate by the age of sixty is zero, for all
practical statistical purposes.159 As mentioned above, Mexico
permits a prison term of up to sixty years. Thus, according to the

151. LId.

152. Inter-American Convention on Extradition, Feb. 25, 1981, O.A.S. Document
OEA/Ser.A36 (SEPF), 20 I.L.M. 723 (entered into force Mar. 28, 1992) (the following
countries signed the Inter-American Convention on Extradition: Chile, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panama,
Uruguay, and Venezuela); Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 411.
153. The U.S.-Venezuela Extradition Treaty forbids extradition if the suspect faces life
imprisonment in the United States, unless Venezuela receives an assurance that life
imprisonment will not be imposed. The treaty does not state what would constitute an
adequate assurance. Extradition Treaty, Jan. 19-21, 1922, U.S.-Venez., art. IV, 43 Stat.
1698, 1702; Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 411 n. 54.
154. C.P.D.F. art. 25 (Mex.); Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 409 n.38.
155. Jeffrey Butts, Youth Violence: Perception Versus Reality, at http://www.urban.org/
urlprint.cfm?ID=7492 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003); Joshua Dressier, Why Keep the
ProvocationDefense?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject, 86 MINN. L. REV. 959, 978
n.81 (2002).

156. Butts, supra note 155. The age-crime curve says that age is inversely related to
crime and applies "[r]egardless of economic status, marital status, race, sex, and soon."
LARRY J. SIEGEL, CRIMINOLOGY 62 (6th ed. 1998).

157. SIEGEL, supra note 156, at 63.
158. Dressler, supra note 155, at 978 n.81.
159. Butts, supra note 155.
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age-crime curve, it is statistically unlikely that an extraditee would
commit a crime after spending sixty years in prison. As a result,
the United States would still satisfy its need to punish criminals
and protect society if it followed Mexican sentencing guidelines in
extradition cases from Mexico. Finally, such an approach ensures
that Mexico will not become a safe-haven for criminals.
7. Alternatives to Following Mexican Sentencing Guidelines
Although the United States will at times be unable to
prosecute to the full extent of U.S. law, the alternatives to
following Mexican sentencing guidelines are bleak. For example,
Labardini hypothesized a Mexican constitutional amendment "to
explicitly provide for life imprisonment."' 6 Labardini argued that
because life imprisonment is prohibited by the Mexican
Constitution, a mere amendment to the U.S.-Mexico Extradition
Treaty is inadequate to cure the current dilemma posed by
Mexico's October 2001 ruling.16 Labardini warns, however, that
"due to the current domestic political situation, opening debate to
amend the Constitution ... will prove very difficult, similar to a

Pandora's Box that could even pull into public debate the settled
issue of extraditing Mexican nationals.' '

62

Moreover, because

passing a constitutional amendment is such a long and tedious
endeavor, this alternative would not provide current relief to U.S.
prosecutors seeking extradition from Mexico. Also, there is no
indication that such a constitutional amendment could even be
passed. Therefore, amending Mexico's constitution to provide for
life imprisonment is not a viable alternative.
Contrary to Labardini's argument, amending the U.S.-Mexico
Extradition Treaty does appear to be a viable alternative.
Labardini argued that this is not a viable alternative because
Mexican courts can disregard non-life imprisonment assurances
from the United States if a court is not satisfied with the language
of such an assurance.163 This is exactly where the language of the
U.S.-Mexico Extradition Treaty needs to be amended, however.
The treaty must specifically state what constitutes an adequate
non-life imprisonment assurance. Consequently, Mexican courts

160. Labardini, Life Imprisonment, supra note 4, at 414.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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could not arbitrarily throw out non-life imprisonment assurances
from the United States.
In sum, it appears that the best solution is to follow Mexico's
sentencing guidelines to ensure continued extradition from Mexico
to the United States. This is the simplest, fastest, and most costeffective approach. Some may argue that such an approach
diminishes U.S. sovereignty because the United States would be
following Mexican sentencing guidelines in U.S. courts. This
approach, however, is simply a compromise to effectively extradite
and punish criminals. Indeed, "[c]ompromising to facilitate
extradition is not unusual."' ' Before the October 2001 ruling, U.S.
prosecutors "regularly promised not to pursue the death penalty"
when requesting extradition from Mexico. 65 Thus, the United
States must now also promise not to seek life imprisonment when
requesting extradition from Mexico. Non-life imprisonment
assurances, however, are complicated by the fact that a judge is
free upon sentencing to impose a life sentence despite such an
assurance. As a result, in extradition cases from Mexico, U.S.
judges must adhere to the non-life imprisonment assurances given
to Mexico to ensure extradition to the United States.
B. U.S. Law
The United States takes a different position than Mexico in
inquiring into the punishment that potentially awaits an extraditee
in the requesting state. Under what is known as the rule of noninquiry, the United States does not generally "inquire into the
processes by which a requested state secures evidence of probable
cause to request extradition, the means by which a criminal
conviction is obtained in a foreign state, or the penal treatment to
which a relator may be subjected upon extradition."' This rule of
non-inquiry was judicially developed in 1901 in the case of Neely v.
Henkel. 6' There, the Supreme Court held that protections in the
U.S. criminal system do not apply to crimes that take place outside

164. Id. at 413 n.75.
165. Id.
166. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW
AND PRACTICE 569 (4th ed. 2002).

167. Neely, 180 U.S. at 109; Wilson, supra note 6, at 753 (Wilson proposes that judicial
inquiry should be allowed into the criminal processes as well as the conditions and severity
of punishment that await an extraditee in a foreign country).
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of the United States. 16 Today, the rule of non-inquiry is generally
stated as: "an extraditing court will generally not inquire into the
procedures or treatment which await a surrendered fugitive in the
requesting country.', 169 The theory behind this rule is that the
power to make such 17determinations belongs to the executive
branch, not the courts. 0
1. Consequences of the Rule of Non-inquiry
One of the dire consequences resulting from the rule of noninquiry and leaving discretion to the executive branch is "a bona
fide claim of unfair treatment would not receive adequate71
consideration by either the judicial or executive branch."'
Moreover, the executive branch could sacrifice individual interests
to maintain foreign relations. In addition, "the executive branch,
acting through the Justice Department in extradition proceedings,
may have ethical conflicts in distancing itself from the interests of
foreign governments" because during the extradition process, the
Department of Justice represents the legal interests of the state
requesting extradition.'73 The executive branch cannot represent
the interests of the state requesting extradition and at the same
time "neutrally assess the potential human rights consequences of
extradition.,V

Moreover, there is little evidence that the executive branch is
a better fact-finder than the judicial branch. 175 There is even
evidence to the contrary, such as past executive branch decisions
to negotiate extradition treaties with governments that have since
become repressive.176 Therefore, abandoning the rule of noninquiry allows courts to inquire into theyrocedures and treatment
awaiting an extraditee in a foreign state.

168. See Neely, 180 U.S. at 123. Wilson, supra note 6, at 753.
169. Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679, 683 (9th Cir. 1983);
Mainero v. Gregg, 164 F.3d 1199, 1210 (9th Cir. 1999).
170. Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1210; BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 572-73.
171. Leslie Anderson, Protecting the Rights of the Requested Person in Extradition
Proceedings:An Argument for a HumanitarianException, 1983 MICH. Y.B. INT'L LEGAL
STUD. 153,153-54.

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 164.
Wilson, supra note 6, at 755.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3. A Possible Humanitarian Exception
There is a possible humanitarian exception to the rule of noninquiry, however."" In Gallina v. Fraser,the Second Circuit stated
in dictum that "[w]e can imagine situations where the relator, upon
extradition, would be subject to procedures or punishments so
antipathetic to a federal court's sense of decency as to require
reexamination of the principle set out above."7 9 The court,
however, held that the humanitarian exception did not apIly in
this case where an Italian court convicted Gallina in absentia.
The Gallina court's reluctance to apply the humanitarian
exception to bar the extradition of a defendant is echoed in many
cases.' For example, in Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, the Ninth
Circuit declined to apply the humanitarian exception even though
evidence was introduced that Cornejo-Barreto had been tortured
by the Mexican police.182 Cornejo-Barreto testified, among other
things, that he was "deprived of food and water, subjected to death
threats, beaten with fists and rifle butts, repeatedly hooded with a
plastic bag until he lost consciousness, hung by the wrists, and
shocked with electrodes attached to various parts of his body
including his genitals.'. 83 Indeed, Cornejo-Barreto believed that if
he was extradited to Mexico, he would again be tortured by the
Mexican police.'s The Ninth Circuit, however, "deferred to the
Secretary of State to exercise Executive Discretion on the basis of
that [Cornejo-Barreto] would present to the Secretary of
a petition
State.""'8
In Cornejo-Barreto, the Ninth Circuit discussed Article 3 of
the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 86 Article 3
prohibits the extradition of a person "to another State where there
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of

178.
179.

Gallina,278 F.2d at 79; BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 572.
Gallina,278 F.2d at 79.

180.

Id.

181. See Escobedo v. United States, 623 F.2d 1098, 1107 (5th Cir. 1980); CornejoBarreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000); Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1210.
182.

See Cornejo-Barreto,218 F.3d at 1008, 1017.

183.
184.
185.
186.

See Id. at 1008.
Id.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 583; see also Cornejo-Barreto,218 F.3d at 1014.
Cornejo-Barreto,218 F.3d at 1010-16.

2003]

Extraditionand Life Imprisonment

being subjected to torture." 87 The Ninth Circuit determined that
the Convention Against Torture must be upheld under the
discretion of the executive branch, not the judicial branch,'8 in line
with other courts. 189

The Ninth Circuit also declined to apply the humanitarian
exception in Mainero v. Gregg.'9 In that case, the appellants,
charged with "murder and criminal association with the Arellano
Felix drug trafficking organization [AFO],"' 9 ' claimed that they
were tortured in Mexico and that their statements were obtained
under duress. 92 The appellants urged the court not to extradite
them to Mexico because they feared they would be further
tortured into implicating others in the AFO. 193 In reaching a
conclusion, the court stated that "to date no court has ever denied
extradition based on a fugitive's anticipated treatment in the
requesting country."' 94 The court further held that, the claims of
torture were speculative.9' The court then concluded that "inview
of the facts of this case, the well established rule of non-inquiry,
and the scant authority for creating a humanitarian exception, we
decline to overturn either extradition order on humanitarian
grounds.' ' 196 Therefore, it appears that the humanitarian exception,
mentioned in dictum in the Gallina opinion, is marginally effective.
There is mounting dicta, however, in some circuit court
opinions, that the rule of non-inquiry could be eroded in the
proper case.' 97 This could theoretically happen in two types of

cases:
1) where the evidence presented by the requested state is the
product of a serious violation of due process (such as torture),
the court could give no weight or even refuse to admit the
evidence; and 2) where there is evidence that the individual

187.

G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51 at 4, U.N. Doc. A/39/51

(1984) [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; see BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 583.
Both the United States and Mexico have ratified the Convention against Torture.
Cornejo-Barreto,218 F.3d at 1011.
188. See Cornejo-Barreto,218 F.3d at 1014.
189. BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 583.
190. Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1210.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1204.
193. Id. at 1210.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 575.
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may be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in
the requesting state, the court could refuse to order the relator's
extradition.
The Ninth Circuit's haunting words, however, show that "to date
no court has ever denied extradition based on a fugitive's
anticipated treatment in the requesting country."199 Nonetheless,

the "limited inquiry" in which some courts have engaged with
regard to the humanitarian exception indicates that such inquiry
may be expanded if allowed by treaty.2 0
The rule of non-inquiry does not need to be abandoned,
however, if courts are willing to apply the humanitarian exception
in appropriate cases. For example, in Mainero v. Gregg, the court
declined to apply the humanitarian exception, noting that the
claims of torture were purely speculative. Therefore, it appears
that if a claim of torture could be substantiated, that the Ninth
Circuit would be willing to apply the humanitarian exception.
If U.S. courts begin to apply the humanitarian exception, it
could significantly add to the tension created by Mexico's October
2001 ruling, which prohibits extradition if a suspect faces life
imprisonment in the country requesting extradition. Application of
the humanitarian exception might add to the tension because U.S.
courts would be inquiring into the procedures and punishments
awaiting an extraditee in Mexico. Such inquiry may not only
exacerbate tensions, but may also frustrate extradition between
the United States and Mexico because U.S. courts would be taking
an active stance in prohibiting extradition on grounds of torture or
similar unfair treatment. Even though application of the
humanitarian exception might increase tension and further
frustrate extradition, it is necessary for the judiciary to ensure that
the procedures or punishments in the country requesting
extradition are not "antipathetic to a federal court's sense of
decency. ,212

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 575.
Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1210.
BASSIOUNI, supra note 166, at 583.
Mainero, 164 F.3d at 1210.
Gallina,278 F.2d at 79.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Extradition between the United States and Mexico has been a
contentious issue for many years. The October 2, 2001 Mexican
Supreme Court ruling, prohibiting extradition if a potential
extraditee faces a life sentence in the requesting state, adds to the
turmoil.
The fastest, simplest, and most cost-effective way to facilitate
extradition from Mexico to the United States is to follow Mexico's
sentencing guidelines in punishing extraditees. Following Mexico's
sentencing guidelines will accomplish a number of important goals.
First, it ensures that Mexico will continue to extradite suspects to
the United States thus avoiding a safe-haven for criminals in
Mexico. Second, the United States will still be able to effectively
try and punish criminals. Although under Mexico's sentencing
guidelines the United States will only be able to sentence
extraditees from Mexico for up to sixty years in prison, this still
satisfies the need to punish criminals and protect society. Finally,
according to the age-crime curve, a sixty-year sentence will ensure
extremely low recidivism rates because statistically people commit
significantly fewer crimes as they age.
The U.S.-Mexico Extradition treaty must be rewritten to
provide for adequate non-life imprisonment assurances. Such a
provision would prevent a Mexican court from arbitrarily deciding
that a non-life imprisonment assurance was inadequate. In
addition, it may be necessary for U.S. courts to agree not to
impose a life sentence, if Mexico was given a non-life
imprisonment assurance in exchange for extradition to the United
States.
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Finally, U.S. courts should begin actively inquiring into the
procedures and treatment awaiting an extraditee in a country
requesting extradition, via the humanitarian exception. While such
inquiry may further add to the tension between the U.S. and
Mexico, U.S. courts must take an active role in protecting the
human rights of potential extraditees.
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